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This paper examines the relationship between board composition characteristics, particularly 
board gender diversity, size, and independence level on one side, and the level of explicitness 
in reporting related to corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the other. For a sample of 2398 
10-K forms of US firms, we conduct a textual analysis on annual reports published between 
April 1st, 2020, and March 31st, 2021. We identify important CSR-related topics and establish 
dictionaries of most indicative words for them. We then process texts with the reports to 
construct the measure that defines the level of explicitness. Our results confirm that companies 
with more women on the board tend to disclose more explicitly on CSR-related topics in general 
annual reports. However, board size is not significant in predicting the same measure. When 
controlling for additional factors, we confirm that independence level of the board has no 
correlation with explicitness level. Finally, we suggest some important avenues for future 
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Change in societies and culture of accountability for company's activities in various fields such 
as environmental and philanthropy-related issues led to the conceptualization of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). Prior research focuses on the relationships between firms’ board 
composition characteristics, such as board independence and board gender diversity on the one 
side, and CSR performance on the other, but there is a lack of research on how board 
composition affects CSR disclosure (i.e., explicitness of disclosure). Aguilera et al. (2006) 
mention that it is the responsibility of a board of directors to create an internal drive towards 
CSR activities and subsequent reporting, which lies in line with the implementation of basic 
mechanism of corporate governance. Thus, they argue that the firms’ board of directors is the 
body responsible for firms’ CSR performance and disclosure. A documented underlying 
mechanism (Rao & Tilt, 2016) points out that that the board structure has the potential to 
influence corporate decisions around development of socially and environmentally responsible 
policies and involvement CSR practices. Such influence can give motives to companies to 
reflect these activities in their disclosure. Thus, we expect that the board structure is related to 
the way companies report about their activities. 
Apart from examining the effect of board independence on the level of explicitness, we follow 
the lead of prior literature by investigating whether other prominent board characteristics have 
a significant effect on the dependent variable that is central to this study. We additionally 
explore the relationship between size of the board and gender diversity level and the explicitness 
of CSR-related disclosure, using data for 2398 listed companies in the United States.  
Since all U.S. publicly traded firms have to provide annual reports of the company’s business 
and financial status to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on Form 10-K, it makes    
the reports an important tool for implementation of studies where companies stand in 
comparable frames. 
According to Matten & Moon (2008), the explicitness of CSR disclosure measures the 
proportion of CSR disclosure that conveys specific claims to readers—more explicit CSR 
disclosures often include more useful information than less explicit ones within the same 




report’s quality, meaning that CSR reports with higher explicitness level can provide more 
useful information for a broad range of stakeholders.  
In this paper, we follow the methodology developed by Hummel et al. (2019), which is one of 
the most recent investigations on the explicitness level of CSR disclosure. In their study, 
researchers measure explicitness of CSR disclosure by the level of similarity between CSR 
reports and a pre-defined set of topic-related texts that contain the most relevant CSR terms. 
The higher the similarity level of CSR reports to the topic text, the more explicit it is.  
According to Hummel et al. (2019), the explicitness of CSR can be a measure of CSR report’s 
textual quality, hence we are interested in whether there are relationships between this textual 
characteristic and the board composition.   
This paper deepens the research on characteristics of CSR-related disclosure. We analyze 
potential drivers that affect the explicitness level of reporting. The results of the study are mixed 
in relation to our hypotheses. When it comes to the explicitness level in corporate reporting on 
CSR-related topics, we find a positive significant relationship with “gender diversity”, while 
considering some controlling variables like market capitalization, pretax ROA, and GRI 
reporting. The setup includes 9 models in 7 of which the measure is significantly positively 
connected with explicitness with parameter estimates between 0,2 and 0,43 depending on the 
model. Therefore, our result lets us admit the second hypothesis. 
At the same time, we find evidence for non-correlation of explicitness level with size and level 
of independence of the board. In the same setup, we additionally control for board committees 
and some evidence of non-linear relationship when examining the connection of dependent 
variable with the level of independence of the board. We adapt categorization of the board that 
generalizes level of independence into wider definitions and assign companies in one of 4 
categories, based on the methodology that is proposed by Bhagat & Black (2001) in a parallel 





In this section, we start with the anticipated contribution and continue providing background 
on Corporate Social Responsibility systems and 3 elements of board composition: size, gender 
diversity, and independence. We further show in each respective subsection evidence for the 
hypotheses that form the focus of this study.  
Background 
Our paper relates to a research area that overviews the potential effect of board composition on 
CSR reporting. We try to detect if any of the characteristics of board composition can be 
considered a predictor for a more specific and explicit reporting on CSR activities. 
Over the prior two decades, the rising awareness of environmental and social issues has pushed 
companies to engage in environmentally and socially responsible practices (Agnolucci & 
Arvanitopoulos, 2019 ; Alam et al., 2019) and the image of the large companies often depends 
on their performance regarding corporate social responsibility. CSR is an organizations’ 
broader responsibility towards society. 
Furthermore, Responsible stakeholders substantially increase the pressure for business 
organizations to direct their attention to explicit CSR policies; stakeholders themselves are 
guided in their actions by corporate social disclosure (alongside, for instance, media coverage 
or NGO campaigns) (Höllerer, 2016).  
Bénabou & Tirole (2010) show how environmental activists effectively enforce their pro-social 
preferences on companies. For example, a court in the Netherlands has ruled in a landmark case 
that the oil giant Shell must cut its CO2 emissions by 45% compared to 2019 levels (BBC, 
2021). An environmental group brought the case to the court in 2019, alongside six other bodies 
and more than 17,000 Dutch citizens. Though the decision only applies in this country, it could 
have broader effects elsewhere.  
Why are there different CSR systems? Matten & Moon (2008) argue that understanding, scope, 
and content of CSR significantly differ between governance and business systems that diverge, 
i.e., between liberal market economies (the United States) and coordinated market economies 




opportunity and incentives for business to address responsibility through explicit CSR policies, 
rhetoric, and action, CME represents a system of wider organizational responsibility (embedded 
in broader norms and regulation), yielding comparatively narrow opportunities and incentives 
for business to take explicit responsibility (Höllerer, 2016). Matten & Moon (2008) differentiate 
CSR reporting styles into either explicit, where companies explicitly formulate corporate 
policies, or implicit, where companies assume institutional frameworks implicitly. They 
provide a set of characteristics for the both types. Figure 1 provides a comparative overview 
over the implicit and explicit elements of CSR. Furthermore, Figure 2 illustrates a continuum 
between explicit and implicit CSR. 
According to the previous research, different variables influence CSR disclosure. One of these 
factors is Corporate Governance. Jamali et al. (2008) assert that corporate governance 
encourages managers and executives to set CSR mission and vision, and the board plays an 
important role in achieving and supporting these goals. Given that boards of directors are major 
players in corporate governance, board composition is likely to influence CSR (Rao & Tilt, 
2016). We have not identified studies that take into consideration the explicitness level in corporate 
reporting on CSR-related topics and board characteristics. Therefore, our paper focuses on 3 
elements of board composition (size, gender diversity, and independence) and the possible 
impact on the explicitness level in corporate reporting on CSR-related topics. The following 
paragraphs explain previous research on these topics and formulate our expected input by 
formulating hypotheses. 
Board Independence and CSR Reporting  
Board members, as organization’s key decision-makers, are both accountable and responsible 
for CSR issues to a broad range of stakeholders. Rao & Tilt (2016) argue that the board structure 
has the potential to influence corporate decisions around development of socially and 
environmentally responsible policies and involvement in CSR practices. According to the 
agency theory proposed by Jensen & Meckling (1976), board independence and board diversity 
lead to better monitoring of corporate management which encourages companies to be more 
focused on and concerned about the needs and expectations of various stakeholders (Ibrahim 
Hanefah, 2016). According to Herda et al. (2012), board independence contributes to 




An increase in the number of independent directors on a board strengthens the need for 
voluntary disclosure to shareholders which leads to improved surveillance (Mulcahy & 
Donnelly, 2008). Rouf & Hossan (2020) find in the study that covers all listed banks on the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange that the proportion of independent directors has a significant 
relationship with the CSR disclosure in the annual report by the listed banks in Bangladesh. 
Ahmad et al. (2017) find that by disclosing more details about CSR activities in annual reports, 
companies achieve multiple effects: asymmetric information reduction, and the company's 
reputation/protection enhancement. So, an efficient board puts as a priority improvement and 
advancements in CSR activities. The board’s decisions can adjust managers' interests with the 
long-term goals of both shareholders and non-shareholding stakeholders. Their study concludes 
that having more independent directors does not necessarily enhance board effectiveness, 
especially if they are unable to contribute to the board effectively. Therefore, we want to 
investigate the influence of the proportion of independent members on board on the degree of 
explicitness of CSR. This type of independence would be more specific and contribute to 
achievement of the aforementioned goals. 
Thus,	we	hypothesize	the	following:	 
Hypothesis 1. The proportion of strictly independent directors in a firm is connected with the 
explicitness level in corporate reporting on CSR-related topics. 
Board gender diversity and CSR Reporting  
In the literature, there are debates about one particular characteristic of the board – gender 
diversity. Some studies focus attention on the critical role of gender diversity in board’s 
decision-making (Rao & Tilt, 2016). For instance, Carter et al. (2007) rely on data from Fortune 
100 index companies and find that board gender (and ethnic) diversity increases independence 
and triggers board to address questions that are less likely to be asked by board directors without 
such diversity. Board gender diversity also contributes to creativity, innovation, and high-
quality decision-making (Erhardt et al., 2003).  
Some research points to the impact of board gender diversity on non-financial performance 
including CSR reporting. Bear et al. (2010) investigate how board gender diversity and the 
number of women on boards affect firms’ CSR ratings and how, in turn, CSR affects firms’ 




board. The authors argue that the presence of women on board affects CSR rating through two 
major strength including increased sensitivity and participative decision-making style. Further, 
according to the study, a contribution that women bring to CSR reporting results in enhanced 
corporate reputation.  
In a similar vein, Krüger (2009) concludes that the higher number of women on firms’ boards 
results in higher rates of positive social responsibility activities. Firms with higher proportions 
of female directors tend to be more generous towards society and show more care to the welfare 
of a firm’s natural stakeholders (e.g., communities, workers, or environment). This points to 
the fact that a stronger presence of board members with altruistic preferences does indeed 
translate into more pro-social corporate behaviour. 
Notwithstanding the above literature, there is less (and no research to our knowledge) exploring 
the relationship between board's gender diversity and the degree of explicitness CSR reporting. 
While we see that studies support the idea that CSR reporting is a manifestation that seeks 
enhancement of a company’s reputation and overall performance measures, it is value-adding 
to define whether gender diversity is one of the contributors to the explicitness of CSR 
reporting. 
Thus, we hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 2. Gender diversity on the board is connected with the explicitness level in 
corporate reporting on CSR-related topics. 
Board size and CSR Reporting  
Board size is another attribute of corporate governance which CSR disclosure studies frequently 
emphasize. Literature on board size can be classified into two categories. One is in favour of 
large boards, whereas the other advocates for smaller boards. The findings that support smaller 
boards claim that larger boards are inefficient as they are weak in management control and 
increase agency costs. However, this notion can be called into question by statement that larger 
boards may be less influenced by management. On the other hand, small boards are assumed to 
be efficient, but they may be influenced by managers (Naseem et al., 2017). This group believes 
that a board's effectiveness may decline as board size increases above a moderate number 




An indirect way to assess whether boards may be too large is to examine the factors that affect 
board size. Firms with strong insider control and, therefore, greater incentive to choose optimal 
board size tend to have smaller boards. For example, Gertner and Kaplan report that firms that 
have undergone reverse leveraged buyouts (undergone a leveraged buyout and then gone public 
again) have smaller boards than public firms generally (Gertner & Kaplan, 1996). 
Several studies find a positive correlation between the size of the board of directors and CSR 
disclosure (Zaid et al, 2019; Esa & Ghazali, 2012). According to Abeysekera (2010), a larger 
board size assists boards in overcoming skill deficits in allowing more substantial disclosures 
about future earnings. Chapple & Moon (2005) assert that a larger board size could contribute 
to a higher engagement and participation in CSR operations, and thus its disclosure in the annual 
report, through a more comprehensive exchange of ideas and experiences. For total CSR, 
environmental and social disclosure, (Dyduch & Krasodomska, 2017) have not found any 
association between disclosure level and board size, profitability, financial leverage, and 
women on the board. 
Thus,	we	hypothesize	the	following:	 









Figure 1: Explicit and implicit CSR (Source: adapted from Matten & Moon, 2008: 410) 
 
 





In this section, we start by presenting our research design. Then, we discuss our data collection 
and sampling process. It follows by the specification of dependent, independent, and baseline 
control variables. We subsequently provide descriptive statistics for the key variables in our 
sample.  
Research Design 
For our sample, we rely on 10-K reports from publicly traded U.S.-based companies that are 
accessible in the EDGAR database of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Data related to board characteristics is accessible for the 3 preceding years in Thomson Reuters 
Eikon, however, there is a substantial number of missing observations for some of the variables 
of interest which reduces the number of companies that we can overview in our work. We 
analyze annual reports published between April 1st, 2020 and March 31st, 2021, covering 1 full 
year of reporting. 
We divide the data collection into two parts. Firstly, we identify the companies using Thomson 
Reuters Eikon and download data points of interest from the database. In the next phase, we 
download the reports of the companies from the EDGAR database. The reports are stored as 
10-K forms that are submitted to the commission. When choosing the textual representation of 
the disclosure we are facing a choice between corporate social responsibility (CSR) report and 
more broad whole company-level reports that are available in EDGAR. One of the positive 
sides of analysis on 10-K reports is that the form has a rigid structure which allows for a more 
comparable analysis between companies. 
In the following steps, we specify the dependent variables that relate to CSR topics. To identify 
the level of explicitness of the report based on the chosen topic, we pre-process reports and 
compare the number occurrences of the words from the topic training set with occurrences of 
such words in the report using cosine similarity.  
Sample  
Matten & Moon (2004) offer and justify the distinction between ‘explicit’ (American) and 
‘implicit’ (embedded in broader norms and regulation) CSR and provide an argument that 




salience of social issues to individual corporations. Therefore, we consider all accessible U.S. 
companies. 
In the first step, we choose 11727 U.S.-based companies that are publicly listed. To further 
align our research with comparable studies and increase the quality of the sample we identify 
criteria that ensure that we include more representative companies in the sample. Table 1 below 
provides a step-by-step process of sampling.  
Companies that fall into our sample category should be fairly large and fairly liquid. Based on 
these criteria we include companies with a market capitalization of at least US$ 100 million 
that have a daily average traded volume in 2020 of at least US$ 100 000. Additionally, we 
consider all companies, except ETFs and investment funds that fall in the initial sample but 
need to be eliminated. This process narrows down the sample to 3393 companies. Some of the 
variables that are important for this research were missing in the dataset or look unreliable. For 
example, pretax ROA values of more than +100% and less than -100% and occurrences with 
board size values more than 17 are not in the final sample. It results in 945 remove observations. 
Finally, after we download and process reports from the EDGAR database, additional concerns 
appear from the second part of the data which deals with the length of the reports. We eliminate 
observations with a cleaned report length of fewer than 10 000 words. These steps reduce our 
final sample to a total of 2398 companies. 
Table 1: Sample selection process 
 Total 
Initial population of US based firms 11727 
Less: Companies with Market Capitalization less than US$ 100 m. 6044 
 5683 
Less: Companies with daily average traded volume less than US$ 100 000 1035 
 4648 
Less: investment funds and ETFs 1255 
 3393 
Less: observations with missing values 945 
 2448 
Less: oservations with dubious values 50 
Total sample 2398 
Table 2 shows that in total we have companies from 18 sectors. The manufacturing sector 




Table 2: Sample distribution by industry group 
NAICS sector Number of companies 
1 Accommodation and Food Services    48 
2 Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services 40 
3 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 5 
4 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 10 
5 Construction 40 
6 Educational Services 12 
7 Finance and Insurance 455 
8 Health Care and Social Assistance 43 
9 Information 192 
10 Manufacturing 742 
11 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 78 
12 Other Services (except Public Administration) 10 
13 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 255 
14 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 178 
15 Retail Trade 102 
16 Transportation and Warehousing   67 
17 Utilities   64 
18 Wholesale Trade                                                              57 
Total Sample 2398 
Analysis of the sample informs us about additional characteristics that are not included in the 
exploration part of this paper but are relevant as characteristics of the board of directors. When 
looking at the composition of board committees in the sample – all companies have a dedicated 
audit committee. The compensation committee is present in an overwhelming 98% of the firms 
in the sample. CEO is part of the board for 97,4 % of companies. Most companies (99,2%) have 
a policy on the experience of board members for qualification to be part of the board. 
Information on CSR-related matters shows that 1,4% of companies are facing environmental 
controversies. 
After we define the sample size, we use ticker information from the Eikon database and retrieve 
reports for the companies using the Central Index Key (CIK). For that, we use a transfer table 
between CIK and ticker that SEC provides on their site. To compile our unique dataset, for each 
of the firms we collect 10-K reports for the defined period.  
We pre-process reports and clean them from HTML tags, stop words, numbers, and symbols. 





Dependent variables: constructing CSR-related topics 
Previous research (Hummel et al., 2019 Fortuna et al., 2020; Matten & Moon, 2008) suggests 
that there are specific topics that can characterize CSR activities of the firm. Explicitness of 
disclosure on these topics can reflect the activities of the firms. ‘Explicit CSR’ refers to 
corporate policies that assume and articulate responsibility for some societal interests. They 
usually consist of voluntary programs and strategies by corporations that combine social and 
business values and address issues that are part of their social responsibility. As the sample for 
this study consists of companies that are located in liberal market economy (US), we suppose 
that, following deliverables of Matten & Moon (2008), most of the companies are following 
the tendency and are explicit when reporting on their CSR-related work. Thus, the only 
dimension that we should control for when defining the level of explicitness is measuring the 
alikeness of what the topic suggests and how the company is communicating on the chosen 
topic. Following the methodology refined by Hummel et al. (2019) and Fortuna et al (2020) 
and proposed by Campopiano & De Massis (2015), we choose 8 topics that are presented in 
Table 3: 
Table 3: CSR-related topics identified by Campopiano & De Massis (2015) and Hummel et al. (2019) 
Building up on the methodology that is present, we process all the reports in our sample and 
create a dictionary with a following frequency list. In the first phase we include relevant terms 
that are representative of the topics and repeated at least 400 times in the data corpus. We 
Topic Description 
Customers 
“This topic includes aspects such as satisfying customer expectations, customer 
loyalty, and involvement, fair prices” 
Education 
“This topic includes aspects that reflect firm’s engagement in development of 
education and knowledge growth.” 
Employees “This topic refers to good working conditions, to the involvement of employees 




“This topic relates to concerns for environmental conservation and includes 
issues such as responsible use of energy and material resources, reduction of 
pollution emissions, green research and innovation” 
Philanthropy 
“This topic refers to the respect for local community, engaging in projects for 




“This topic is related to production efficiency, quality guarantees, and 
improvements, waste reduction, recycling materials, product safety” 
Stakeholder 
management 
“This topic includes all issues related to satisfying stakeholder claims, 
stakeholder dialogue, stakeholder involvement in decision-making process” 
Values and 




additionally create dictionaries and frequency tables for bigrams and trigrams in the corpus. In 
the next step we include some of the terms that contain unigram that we identified in the 
previous step. It assists in narrowing down the use cases of some terms that can have several 
connotations or areas of use. In such cases we prioritize relevant longer word combinations and 
eliminate shorter ones. The second column in Table 4 illustrates the resulting form of the topics 
that includes all chosen terms. 
For every word or a word combination in the topic, we retrieve the words that appear before 
and after them. This approach helps to construct word windows that enable us to capture the 
topic more broadly than just the initial search terms. Each window has a length of 20 words. 
Depending on the length of the initial term, the word window takes 8 to 10 words before the 
term and 9 words after it. Due to a large number of terms, we want to avoid repetitions of parts 
of text in the new training corpus. To control for it, we define the position of the terms in the 
text and delete all word windows in which the distance from the previous word-window is less 
than 19 words. For each topic, we merge word windows and construct 8 training sets. Examples 
of the word windows presented in Appendix 2. 
Before finalizing the new corpora of topics, we choose to narrow them down. The previous step 
adds from 17 to 19 new words that are initially not part of the topic that we select for the 
research. We notice that some of the more general terms reappear as a result of it. It is possible 
to identify popular general terms with higher reliability because of the larger number of terms 
that constitute each topic than previous research suggests. 
We create a frequency table for all 8 new training sets and identify a list of general words that 
do not characterize CSR topics. We eliminate all of the word windows that include such terms. 
As it can be noted, the most popular word in the topic environment and green growth – ‘risk’, 
and in the topic values and general interests – ‘value’. Both of these words can be too general 
for their word windows to communicate information related to the topics and avoid nonessential 
connotations. We identify irrelevant bigrams and trigrams with these words and eliminate all 
word windows with occurrences that contain such terms. Table in Appendix 3 exemplifies the 
terms. These additional steps ensure a higher quality of the topic despite a larger number of 
terms included.  
The third column in Table 4 depicts the number of topic words in the sample corpus. The next 
column summarizes the total number of words in the filtered training set for each of the topics 




reasons, we provide the number of unique words in the cleaned full sample corpus of reports –
38257. 
Table 4: Description of the topics and variable assignment  
CSR-related 
topic Topic words 
Number of 
topic words 












client (14459), retention (9627), customary (8596), customer 
relationships (7407), satisfaction (6284), user (6024), purchasers 
(4703), customer base (4463), customer service (4333), loyalty 
(3345), buyers (3220), consumption (3129), purchaser (2561), 
customer experience (1825), relationships customers (1541), customer 
relationship (1540), consumer privacy (1469), service customers 
(1231), customer needs (1221), brand recognition (961), client 
relationships (823), technology customer relationships (530), good 
service customer (472) 
89764 81589 6966 
Education 
topic_2 
research development (38500), studies (21004), study (16686), course 
(16358), training (12780), education (9088), university (8378), 
knowledge (7999), scientific (6460), learning (3647), science (3574), 
student (3246), school (2788), academic (2160), college (1541), 
tuition (1248), trained (928) 
156385 316130 12193 
Employees 
topic_3 
professional (17707), labor (16672), staff (12843), workforce (11984), 
parent (11114), family (10358), employee stock (9163), health safety 
(8728), diversity (7660), talent (6906), salaries (6382), post retirement 
benefit (6117), salary (5750), workers compensation (5077), key 
personnel (4988), hire (4483), skill (1616), workplace (3648), hiring 
(3470), employee benefit (3397), wages (3292), qualified personnel 
(3074), recruit (3023), women (2770), families (2734), career (2667), 
employee compensation (2557), leave (2519), job (2319), illness 
(2223), base salary (2055), safety employees (1917), safety health 
(1556), work environment (1275), gender (1123), discrimination 
(949), health care benefits (915), employee stock options (908), 
employee health (785) 





risk (171958), global (64419), nature (24839), electric (15840), 
climate (8411), solar (7237), natural disasters (5905), globally (5836), 
renewable (5669), organic (5633), climate change (5457), 
contamination (4838), nuclear (4780), wind (3698), carbon (3459), 
footprint (3349), weather conditions (3135), biologic (2911), cleanup 
(2592), renewable energy (2526), greenhouse (2417), rate 
environment (2321), environmental health safety (2167), pollution 
(2135), toxic (1711), animal health (1551), solar energy systems 
(1260), greenhouse gas emissions (1215), local environmental (684) 
367953 519108 14701 
Philantropy 
topic_5 
grant (42781), local (42556), care (34117), community (15108), social 
(14533), communities (12009), therapies (8153), sponsoring 
organizations (6636), therapeutic (6509), aid (4949), hospitality 
(3147), average grant (3031), initiative (2979), charitable (1413), 
sponsorship (967) 





quality (39479), reduction (34184), recoverable (10527), packaging 
(7393), quality control (2439), waste (7032), recycling (1767), 
recycled (995), product development programs (379) 







commitment (13901), shareholder (10225), investor (9886), 
stockholder (21379), service providers (10164), owner (7726), 
supplier (6840), engagement (6070) 





value (413422), respect (54361), rules (38242), conduct (32179), 
recognition (31441), responsible (18826), responsibility (12964), 
participation (12238), reliability (8983), culture (6948), voluntary 
(5511), integrity (5185), transparency (3287), code ethics (2912), 
anticorruption (2257), justice (1960), voluntarily (1787), ethical 
(1359), welfare (1285), commonwealth (1238), transparent (590) 
656975 377231 12678 
The next step is to use the corpora with topics in comparison with the reports’ texts. 
Measurement of similarity between frequency of the word in a topic and a report gives us a 
representation of the level of explicitness of the report. Topics contain fewer unique words than 
the dictionary of all topics. At the same time, in every report, the number of words is not 
consistent.  
To measure how explicit a report addresses the pre-defined topics we compute the cosine 
similarity between the word vectors of each report and training set for every CSR topic. In the 
process the choices to be made about scaling of the measure and transformation of the number 
of occurrences of the words in a binary form. We wish to investigate the number of occurrences 
of words in a report, so we choose to preserve initial data and do not perform scaling as well. 
An important point when comparing a topic with a report is that we stress the importance of 
terms that exist in the topic. For every topic, only the words that are initially present in the topic 
are compared with the report. We include in the analysis words that are repeated at least 250 
times in the reports to avoid excessive sparsity of the measure. Depending on the topic, we 
calculate the final measure on the window of unique 3458–5997 words. We further use an 
average of cosine similarity measures for all topics to define an average measure that takes into 
consideration all topics as an aggregative measure. 
Another way of performing analysis on topics bases on a simple frequency of all terms of the 
topic and the creation of variables based on this measure. Cannon et al. (2020) employ this 
approach in a similar study that uses CSR-related topics with a substantial number of words in 
each group. We choose to use the cosine similarity measure because it captures the effects of 
similarity between every pair of words.  
In the table of Appendix 3, we provide highlights of the 20-word windows for each topic and 






Three independent variables that we include in this research are the level of independence of 
the board of directors, size of the board, and percentage of women on the board of directors. 
Variables for the size of the board and percentage of women on the board are part of the research 
as reported by companies. 
For the level of independence, we choose to use the level of strict independence of the board as 
a more reliable measurement. The measure of strict independence provided by Thomson 
Reuters Eikon treats affiliated directors as dependent. Definition of a strictly independent board 
member includes the following: 
1. not employed by the company;  
2. not served on the board for more than ten years;  
3. not a reference shareholder with more than 5% of holdings;  
4. no cross-board membership;  
5. no recent, immediate family ties to the corporation;  
6. not accepting any compensation other than compensation for board service. 
It could be that directors who are on the board for a long period, being nominally independent, 
create connections in the company and cannot be considered as such. Gilson & Kraakman 
(1991) mention that the concept of an independent director might not always follow the 
common wisdom. They argue that "corporate boards need directors who are not merely 
independent [of management], but who are accountable [to shareholders] as well." Some 
directors are connected to the company in ways that are not specified by existing definitions of 
"independence". Some examples of connections include paid consultancy or advisory roles for 
connected firms, or paid management roles in foundations or universities that are connected to 
the company. Bhagat & Black (1999) suggest that a way for these subtle relationships to be 
seen can be for the SEC to specify the need for additional disclosure of financial and personal 





Control variables: determining baseline variables 
We select control variables in alignment with prior research that examines CSR disclosure 
(Hummel et al., 2019; Fortuna et al., 2020; Cannon et al., 2020). The following measures are 
included in the analysis because they may exert influences on the outcome variable that overlap 
with or interfere with the influence of main independent variables. First, we rely on 
determinants of CSR disclosure and include the firm’s market capitalization (control for size), 
industry, and pretax ROA (control for financial performance).  
Market capitalization signifies a company’s size (Wallace & Naser, 1995). Companies with 
large market capitalization are commonly exposed to political charges, such as demands by 
society for the performance of social responsibility or more comprehensive regulation, such as 
price controls and higher corporate tax (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). More extensive disclosure 
reports like CSR can reduce these consequences. Conversely, companies with low market 
capitalization are more likely to feel that more open and specified disclosure would be 
detrimental to their competitiveness (Ahmad et al., 2017). 
Rodriguez-Fernandez (2016) and Khan (2010) show that profitability is an essential factor in 
CSR disclosures by companies. Climent-Serrano & Pavía (2015) and Seo et al. (2015) believe 
that Return on Assets (ROA) is a trustworthy proxy for this term. Stakeholders expect both 
financial and non-financial disclosures. As disclosure reports need some costs, companies with 
poor profitability circumstances try to follow the least demanding way to disclose. When 
companies are more profitable, they have more tendency to spend money on reporting.  
Second, we include additional variables that control for reporting patterns of the firm. Namely, 
we use a binary variable to define if a company uses the GRI framework in its reporting 
practices. The GRI is the most commonly used format worldwide for sustainability reporting. 
It provides standardization by requiring participants to report on economic indicators, 
environmental compliance, labor practices, human rights, society, and product responsibility. 
Reports are maintained in a publicly accessible database. 
Third, we add a proxy to disclosure quality. Here we use the ESG disclosure performance score 
which tracks the company’s success based on the reported information for specific data points 






Table 5 provides summary statistics for non-binary variables used in this study. Most of the 
measures for topics follow similar patterns. Interestingly, for topics ‘education’ and ‘values and 
general interests’ standard deviation is substantially higher than in the other topics, which 
suggests a higher disparity between reports in the sample. At the same time, max values for 
these topics are substantially larger, reaching 0,89 and 0,86 accordingly. For Independence, 
size, gender diversity, and market capitalization mean and median have similar values, which 
suggests symmetrical distribution. Roapretax has a negative mean but a positive median. 
Additionally, the standard deviation is 0.179 which suggests a substantial deviation from the 
mean. Market capitalization’s values allocate between 1.67 and 27.4, as we take a natural 
logarithm of initial values to normalize them before including them in our analysis. 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics  
Variable mean median sd min max n 
topic_1 0.1517 0.1392 0.0866 0.0206 0.6791 2398 
topic_2 0.123 0.0331 0.2196 0.0046 0.8983 2398 
topic_3 0.1621 0.1266 0.1086 0.0176 0.5088 2398 
topic_4 0.1303 0.1033 0.0881 0.0123 0.6396 2398 
topic_5 0.1636 0.1056 0.15 0.0165 0.6694 2398 
topic_6 0.1248 0.0848 0.1055 0.0091 0.7431 2398 
topic_7 0.1909 0.1810 0.0712 0.0262 0.4077 2398 
topic_8 0.1626 0.0823 0.2161 0.0134 0.8689 2398 
topics_all 0.1511 0.1161 0.1095 0.0177 0.4885 2398 
strictindepbm 0.4969 0.4933 0.1719 0 0.923 2398 
boardsize 9.2151 9 2.2381 5 17 2398 
genderdiv 0.2108 0.2 0.1075 0 0.625 2398 
markcap 21.78 21.70 1.67 18.43 27.4 2398 
roapretax -0.022 0.014 0.179 -0.989 0.827 2398 
esgcombscore 37,95001 35,3759 17,1482 3,09 92,7544 2398 
Correlation Results 
Table 6 shows bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients. Statistics presents the full sample of 
2398 firm-year observations for the regression variables. The coefficients indicate that all topic-
based measures (except topic 1, which has close to zero correlation level with topics 2, 4, 6, 8) 
are positively correlated. At the same time, we cannot assume a high level of correlation of 




score. Among our main variables, we conclude that gender has a positive correlation with topics 
“Education”, “Environment and Green Growth”, “Processes, products and services”, “Values 
and general interests”. Therefore, based on the univariate statistics, we find support for our 
hypothesis only for gender diversity. In addition, the correlation statistics indicates that the ESG 
score has a moderately positive correlation with financial performance, market capitalization, 
level of gender diversity, and size of the board. Kutner et al., (2005) mention that the fact of 
correlation among independent variables “does not inhibit our ability to obtain a good fit nor 
does it tend to affect inferences about mean responses or predictions of new 
observations”.  Thus, we choose to preserve ESG score in the model. 
t  






In this section, we specify the general form of the model. After that, we proceed with the 
analysis of the baseline regression models analyzing 8 topics and using the data from the 
previous steps. In the last phase, we include a set of modifications in our model to carry out a 
set of robustness checks to verify that our results hold in these modified states. 
Empirical Model  
We use the following empirical model to investigate whether there are differences in the level 
of explicitness of company reports and answer hypotheses about such difference depending on 
the level of independence of the board, the size of the board, and level of gender diversity: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙	𝑜𝑓	𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 𝛽! + 𝛽"	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +	𝛽#		𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽	$𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑝 
+𝛽%𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽	&𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑣 + 𝛽&	𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒	+	𝛽'	𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽(𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
Level of explicitness proxies for our dependent topic include: topic_1– topic_8 and topics_all 
In the model specification step, we use the Akaike information criterion to choose between 
different variations of the model and choose the most suitable variables for the representation 
of one or another characteristic of choice. The dependent variable in that phase is topics_all 
which reflects an average between all 8 specified topics. For the same case we also assess 
robustness of model. We test for multicollinearity by computing a variance inflation 
factor (or VIF).Values for all of the predictors do not raise suspicion for presence of 
multicollinearity: all GVIF are lower than reference boarders 3,5, and 10. 













 GVIF Df GVIF^(1/(2*Df)) 
markcap 1.762 1 1.328 
roapretax 1.341 1 1.158 
strictindepbm 1.076 1 1.037 
boardsize 1.470 1 1.212 
genderdiv 1.256 1 1.121 
esgcombscore 1.989 1 1.410 
grireport 1.700 1 1.304 




Baseline results from maximum likelihood beta regression  
To establish a baseline relationship between the level of independence of the board of directors, 
size of the board, percentage of women on the board of directors, and the level of explicitness 
of topics, we estimate a set of beta regressions using maximum likelihood method:  
Table 7: Results from regression analysis 
 topic_1 topic_2 topic_3 topic_4 topic_5 topic_6 topic_7 topic_8 topics_all 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
markcap -0.001 -0.008 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.003 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.016) (0.011) 
roapretax -0.129* 0.061 0.004 -0.120 0.069 -0.035 -0.066 0.071 -0.007 
 (0.072) (0.135) (0.086) (0.083) (0.104) (0.098) (0.058) (0.127) (0.087) 
strictindepbm 0.022 -0.016 -0.069 0.001 -0.062 0.025 -0.003 -0.065 -0.017 
 (0.067) (0.126) (0.080) (0.079) (0.097) (0.092) (0.055) (0.118) (0.081) 
boardsize -0.009 -0.004 -0.008 -0.003 -0.004 -0.008 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) 
genderdiv 0.060 0.373* 0.369*** 0.183 0.432*** 0.301* 0.203** 0.405** 0.341** 
 (0.116) (0.217) (0.138) (0.135) (0.167) (0.158) (0.094) (0.204) (0.139) 
esgcombscore 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.001 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0005 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
grireport 0.017 0.089 0.100** 0.007 0.091* 0.045 0.029 0.114* 0.079* 
 (0.038) (0.071) (0.045) (0.044) (0.054) (0.052) (0.031) (0.067) (0.046) 
naicssectorAdministra… 0.071 0.162 0.247* -0.026 0.340** 0.153 0.103 0.181 0.194 
 (0.118) (0.218) (0.139) (0.138) (0.167) (0.160) (0.096) (0.206) (0.142) 
naicssectorAgriculture… 0.239 0.151 0.433 0.002 0.413 0.278 0.329* 0.193 0.290 
 (0.247) (0.480) (0.289) (0.303) (0.355) (0.339) (0.199) (0.451) (0.301) 
naicssectorEducational… 0.004 0.194 0.120 0.184 0.167 0.624*** 0.159 0.184 0.254 
 (0.181) (0.329) (0.212) (0.200) (0.254) (0.220) (0.142) (0.310) (0.209) 
naicssectorOther… 0.146 0.234 0.260 -0.068 0.259 0.095 0.272* 0.273 0.239 
 (0.188) (0.354) (0.222) (0.227) (0.270) (0.260) (0.149) (0.332) (0.225) 
naicssectorRetail Trade 0.102 0.196 0.170 0.046 0.230* 0.155 0.124 0.230 0.195* 
 (0.097) (0.179) (0.116) (0.112) (0.139) (0.132) (0.079) (0.169) (0.117) 
naicssectorWholesale… -0.007 0.235 0.212 0.055 0.274* 0.205 0.230*** 0.285 0.230* 
 (0.110) (0.200) (0.129) (0.125) (0.155) (0.146) (0.087) (0.188) (0.130) 
Constant -1.702*** -1.725*** -1.628*** -1.967*** -1.661*** -2.067*** -1.528*** -1.437*** -1.769*** 
 (0.194) (0.361) (0.232) (0.226) (0.279) (0.264) (0.158) (0.340) (0.234) 
Observations 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 
R2 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.006 0.013 0.010 0.008 0.012 0.010 
Log Likelihood 2,981.018 2,562.230 2,466.250 2,960.187 2,028.865 2,746.084 3,047.864 1,617.131 2,574.111 
Note: This table reports maximum likelihood Beta-regression estiomates and P-values (in parentheses).We employ the same 
procedure on each CSR-related topic. We provide details on the dependent, independent and control variables in Appendix 
A1. 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Cribari-Neto & Zeileis (2009) specify that beta regression is a standard maximum likelihood 
(ML) task for which there is no closed-form solution but numerical optimization is required. 




Cribari-Neto (2004), to model variables that assume values in the standard unit interval (0, 1). 
This approach naturally incorporates features such as heteroskedasticity or skewness commonly 
observed in data taking values in the standard unit interval, such as rates or proportions. The 
regression parameters are interpretable in terms of the mean of y.  
As Brooks (2002) specifies: even though it could be possible to calculate the values of the 
standard goodness of fit measures such as RSS, R², or R̅² for linear dependent variable models, 
these cease to have any real meaning. The objective of ML is to maximize the value of the 
likelihood function (LLF), not to minimize the residual sum of squares (RSS). Pseudo-R² is in 
use instead, where we target value 1 for the best possible model. However, we lose the simple 
interpretation of the standard R² that it measures the proportion of variation in the dependent 
variable that is explained by the model. Indeed, pseudo-R² does not have an intuitive 
interpretation. Pseudo-R² is highest for models that take topics Employees, Philanthropy and 
Values and general interests.  
One of the control variables that refers to the GRI reporting shows significance in 4 of 9 models 
in which positive relation persists across all of these models. This variable shows the highest 
significance level in the model in which ‘Employees’ topic explicitness level is dependent.  
The financial performance measure is interestingly not significant in the models, except having 
a 10% significance level in the model for topic Customers in which the direction is negative 
with. a coefficient value of -0,129. As specified in Sprinkle & Maines (2010), companies incur 
costs for CSR activities. They also suggest that NGOs often coerce companies to incur even 
more costs to report on their sustainability efforts, which sometimes does not have any 
significant positive shift in the paradigm but only creates additional costs.  
Based on the Log-Likelihood measure, we can conclude that models in which topics 
‘environment and green growth’ and ‘stakeholder management’ presented as dependent 
variables show better results.  In the model with ‘stakeholder management,’ Log-Likelihood 
reaches 3047,9 in comparison to the lowest 1617,1 in model 'Values and general interests'.  
For some models, industry sectors have shown a significant relationship with the topics. We 





Table 8: Relationship between industry of the companies and dependent topics 
Sector Dependent topic(s) direction of a relationship 
(+ or -) 
Administrative and Support and Waste 
Management and Remediation 
Services 
Employees / Philanthropy + / + 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and 
Hunting Stakeholder management + 
Educational Services Processes, products and services + 
Other Services 
(except Public Administration) Stakeholder management + 
Retail Trade Philanthropy / All topics + / + 
Wholesale Trade Philanthropy / Stakeholder management / All topics + / + / + 
An important finding is that most of the models indicate the significance of gender diversity 
characteristic. Depending on the CSR-topic of the model, this ratio is significant at 10% level 
(models 2, 6), 5% (models 7, 8, 9) or 1% (models 3, 5) level. In models with explicitness level 
for topics ‘Customers’ and ‘Environment and green growth’ this variable is not significant.  
In conclusion, we do not find a clear significant relation between two of the measures that are 
part of this work: level of independence and size of the board. However, there is a clear positive 
connection between the similarity of disclosure with the identified CSR-related topics and the 
proportion of women on the corporate boards. Log-Likelihood ratio test suggests that the model 
that provides better fit is model with topic 7 ‘Stakeholder management’. 
Further analysis  
We further conduct a battery of robustness checks to ensure that our instruments are valid and 
our system of equations is well-identified. The	goodness	of	fit	is	assessed	using	different	types	
of	 diagnostic	 displays	 following	 the	 methodology	 proposed	 for	 beta	 regression	 by	 Ferrari & 
Cribari-Neto (2004). Figure 3 depicts the results of the panels for the model 7 ‘Stakeholder 






Figure 4: Diagnostics displays 
The upper left panel plots the standardized weighted residuals against observation number. The upper right panel 
plots standardized residuals against linear predictor. The lower left panel displays the half-normal plot of 
absolute deviance residuals with a simulated envelope. The lower right panel presents a plot of Cook’s distance 
measures versus observation number. 
There are no substantive differences. In the case of beta regression, Espinheira et al. (2008) 
recommend using standardized weighted residuals. And we follow the proposed methodology. 
We assess residuals and note observations with values more than 2 (22 obs.) and less than -2 
(66 obs.). We consider that any observations beyond these boundaries can be potential outliers. 
Additionally, from Cook’s distance plot we see discrepant values. We use the reference number 
of 0,01 to identify 6 observations that fall out from the standard expected values. 
The next point refers to the half-normal plot of absolute deviance residuals, diagnostics for beta 




The outcome conditional on 2 parameters, as Ferrari & Cribari-Neto (2004) discuss in the 
reparameterization, has beta distribution. Consequently, we should not expect the raw residuals 
of a beta regression to be normally distributed; they should be beta distributed. 
One concern that might arise is that 88 observations that have extreme weighted residuals and 
6 potentially unusual but influential observations can substantially influence the setup of the 
model. In Table 8 we present a comparison of results between the actual model and the updated 
version that eliminates these values. 
Table 9. Comparison between topic 7 models before and after cleaning data based on diagnostics displays 
 topic_7 
 (1) (2) 
markcap -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
roapretax -0.066 -0.097* 
 (0.058) (0.054) 
strictindepbm -0.003 -0.029 
 (0.055) (0.051) 
boardsize -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
genderdiv 0.203** 0.297*** 
 (0.094) (0.088) 
esgcombscore -0.0004 -0.00005 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
grireport 0.029 0.042 
 (0.031) (0.029) 
naicssectorAgriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 0.329* 0.302 
 (0.199) (0.231) 
naicssectorFinance and Insurance 0.109 0.121* 
 (0.070) (0.066) 
naicssectorManufacturing 0.100 0.129** 
 (0.068) (0.065) 
naicssectorOther Services (except Public Administration) 0.272* 0.103 
 (0.149) (0.157) 
naicssectorRetail Trade 0.124 0.146* 
 (0.079) (0.075) 
naicssectorWholesale Trade 0.230*** 0.221*** 
 (0.087) (0.082) 
Constant -1.528*** -1.522*** 
 (0.158) (0.147) 
Observations 2,398 2,304 
R2 0.008 0.016 
Log Likelihood 3,047.864 3,120.003 





We conclude that there are no substantial differences. We note that gender diversity level has a 
slightly higher power of significance in the new assessment. Financial control variable pretax 
ROA has a negative value close to -0.1 that is now significant on a 10% confidence level. There 
are some changes in industry control variables as well. However, we do not denote drastic 
positive changes in Log-likelihood and Pseudo-R² values. 
Development of hypothesis about the level of independence  
While we report in the literature review that we expect that the results on the connection of CSR 
and the board size might be mixed when looking back at the existing research that connects, 
there is supportive consideration for such a connection in boards with the high level of 
independence.  
One of the reasons explaining the absence of connection might be that a company does not have 
as many as possible independent directors, but it is better to have some proportion of them.  
Another concept that one might take into consideration when assessing the presence of inside 
directors may be a balance between independence and other factors that influence board 
choices. Inside directors are conflicted but well informed. Independent directors are not 
conflicted, but they might be less familiar with the company. 
Having a reasonable proportion of inside directors on the board could be beneficial, which is 
why there is no clear linear connection between independence level and level of explicitness in 
reporting. Baysinger & Butler (1985) define an optimal board that consists of a mix of inside, 
independent, affiliated directors, who bring different skills and knowledge to the board. 
In the literature review by Bhagat & Black (2001), we find some references to studies that 
promote the idea of the difference in behavior between firms with majority-independent boards 
and firms without such boards (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). However, none of the studies 
reviewed above investigate whether a supermajority-independent board, with only one or two 
inside directors, behaves differently than a majority-independent board. The theoretical case for 
such a high degree of independence affecting the board's monitoring ability is unclear.  
We try testing this idea about a special level of independence that can have a meaningful 
implication. Relying on the methodology of Bhagat & Black (2001), we create a factor variable 




Table 10: Explanation of a new factor variable 
Proportion between: 
Strictly Independent directors / (Insider directors + Affiliated directors) 
Name of the category: 
[0/100 - 35/65] Inside dominant 
[35/65 - 50/50] Inside prevalent 
[50/50 - 65/35] Independent prevalent 
[65/35 – 100/0] Independent dominant 
The results for all 9 models in this new setup (Table 1 in Appendix 4) do not provide any 
significant contribution. We do not observe an interconnection of the level of independence of 
the board and more or less explicit reporting. 
A final possibility is that independent directors can add value if they are part of an appropriate 
committee structure. In this way, independent directors might perform best within the 
monitoring function that they mostly represent, while inside and affiliated directors perform the 
informing and advising function to which they bring more firm-specific expertise. However, 
most large firms already have such committee structures and Klein (1998) finds little evidence 
that the outsider-dominated—audit, compensation, and nominating committees have no 
significant impact. Though, his study works with financial performance as a dependent variable. 
We try to analyze the relationship in our setup by observing two alternative committees. We 
add two binary variables that communicate the presence of corporate governance board 
committee and corporate and social responsibility or sustainable development board committee 
to the initial model. Table 2 in Appendix 4 presents that this direction of hypothesis 
development does not provide any significant results. 
Finally, we conclude that changes in the level of independence on boards are unrelated after 






In this research, we explore the relationships between the characteristics of the board in firms 
and the explicitness of disclosures on CSR-related topics. We rely on measures derived from 
textual analysis following Hummel et al. (2019).  
We test whether some board characteristics would improve the explicitness degree of reporting 
that companies submit in a 10-K form to the SEC. We do this by utilizing textual analysis on 
unique words that are categorized by topics. We do this using the forms of 2398 listed firms in 
the US capital markets that were submitted in one year period. 
The findings in the previous chapter indicate that the characteristics of the board of directors 
can impact the quality of CSR disclosure. We consider size, independence, and gender diversity 
as three main elements of board characteristics. The result of the set of regressions shows that 
companies with more women on their boards tend to have more explicit CSR reporting. The 
results are consistent with the notion from previous research (Rao & Tilt (2016); Rouf & Hossan 
(2020); Cucari et al (2018)). At the same time, we conclude that both the number of members 
on the board and strict independence level has no significant influence on the level of 
explicitness. For the level of independence, we additionally control results for board committees 
and perform simplification of measures to control for non-linear results. 
Our research has at least two main contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, our study 
is the first to investigate the impact of organizations’ board characteristics on the explicitness 
of CSR disclosures. The most recent study about the explicitness of CSR disclosures is by 
Hummel et al. (2019) which explores how economies that firms are located in impact the CSR 
disclosure level in terms of explicit and implicit CSR reporting. Our study goes beyond this and 
through a textual measure of CSR reports reveals how board composition affects the quality of 
CSR disclosure while executing analysis for one specific economy with a well-defined 
homogeneous pattern of reporting. Future research can extend this study by focusing on other 
characteristics of firms’ board (e.g., director ownership, CEO duality, educational qualification 
of board members, and frequency of board meetings) and how they could affect the explicitness 
of CSR disclosures. Another extension is to analyze CSR reports, instead of general reports, 
which can provide new perspectives on the case. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on gender-diverse boards and their impact on CSR 




decisions and CSR outcomes (Rao, 2016). Our study contributes to this literature by illustrating 
a positive relationship between gender diversity, as one of the board characteristics, and the 
explicitness of CSR-related disclosure in annual reports. In other words, a more gender-diverse 
board contributes to higher quality and transparency of CSR report. While one could test further 
if explicitness is a result of actions that women directors direct to CSR initiatives.  
Our study also has some limitations: first, we use cross-sectional data to test the hypotheses. 
Using panel data may produce more accurate results on the links between board composition 
and the explicitness of CSR reporting through analysis of larger data. Second, we analyze firms’ 
reports texts based on 10-K disclosure. As the formats of CSR reports vary by organization, it 
is challenging to have a setup for comparative analysis. At the same time, some companies who 
already do CSR reporting might transfer some parts of it into general reporting frameworks. 
Meanwhile, execution of textual analysis on the text of 10-K forms brings additional noise in 
the analysis. Companies in some of the industries might discuss specific topics more explicitly, 
while the reporting form does not have a clear setup that would incorporate only CSR-related 
matters. When applied to 10-K filings, CSR-related topics do not always objectively represent 
information and reflect attempts of the companies to make positive changes. Whereas, they also 
can display a bias to certain industries. Third, our sample is constrained by data from one 
country. It might be interesting to explore the relationship between board composition and the 
explicitness of CSR across regions and in coordinated market economies.  
Viewed collectively, the findings of this thesis indicate that there is an emerging need for a 
sustainability reporting framework, and discussions from SEC on the topic go in line with this. 
In a recent comment paper, Fleming &Ledbetter (2020) discuss policy proposals on 
Sustainability discussion and analysis that they evaluate as an initiative of critical importance. 
In addition, In March of 2021, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2021) 
addressed the public asking for inputs on Climate Change disclosure which is a clear positive 
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A1 Variable definitions 
Table A1.1: Definitions of dependent and independent variables 
Variable                                       Description Source of data 
Dependent Variable set 
  
Customers (topic_1) 
Similarity between 10-K disclosure and constructed topic model that 










Similarity between 10-K disclosure and constructed topic model that 
reflects disclosure on education 
Employees (topic_3) 
Similarity between 10-K disclosure and constructed topic model that 
reflects disclosure on employee-related subjects 
Environment and green growth 
(topic_4) 
Similarity between 10-K disclosure and constructed topic model that 
reflects disclosure on subjects about environment and green growth 
Philanthropy (topic_5) 
Similarity between 10-K disclosure and constructed topic model that 
reflects disclosure on philantropy 
Processes, products and services 
(topic_6) 
Similarity between 10-K disclosure and constructed topic model that 
reflects disclosure on subjects about processes, products and services 
Stakeholder management 
(topic_7) 
Similarity between 10-K disclosure and constructed topic model that 
reflects disclosure on how company manages its stakeholders 
Values and general interests 
(topic_8) 
Similarity between 10-K disclosure and constructed topic model that 
reflects disclosure on company's value alignment and principles 
All topics (topics_all) 
Similarity between 10-K disclosure and mean value for 8 defined CSR-
related topics 
Main variables of interest   
Independence ratio 
(strictindepbm) 












Size of the board (boardsize) The size of the board (between 5 and 17) 






















Market capitalization (markcap) Natural logarithm of market capitalization in US 
ROA (roa) Return on assets before taxes. 
Corporate governance board 
committee (cgboardcom) 
Binary variable that shows whether company has a corporate governance 
board committee 
CSR board committee 
(csrsustboardcom) 
Binary variable that shows whether company has a nomination board 
committee 
GRI repoort (grireport) 
Binary variable that shows whether company's CSR report published in 
accordance with the GRI guidelines 
ESG combined score 
(esgcombscore) 
Overall company score (ESG Score) based on the reported information 




A2 Examples of twenty-word windows 
Table A2.1: Examples of twenty-word windows 
Twenty-word window Corresponding CSR disclosure 
Customers (topic_1) Colgate-Palmolive 
['also', 'face', 'strong', 'local', 'competitors', 'may', 
'agile', 'better', 'local', 'consumer', 'insights', 'private', 
'label', 'brands', 'sold', 'retailers', 'also', 'source', 
'competition', 'certain'] 
"…In certain geographies, we also face strong local 
competitors, who may be more agile and have better local 
consumer insights than we do. Private label brands sold by 
retailers are also a source of competition for certain…" 
Education (topic_2) PepsiCo 
['continued', 'growth', 'development', 'associates', 
'supports', 'develops', 'associates', 'variety', 'global', 
'training', 'development', 'programs', 'build', 
'strengthen', 'employees', 'leadership', 'professional', 
'skills', 'including', 'career'] 
"…the continued growth and development of our 
associates. PepsiCo supports and develops its associates 
through a variety of global training and development 
programs that build and strengthen employees' leadership 
and professional skills, including career…" 
Employees (topic_3) General Mills 
['minor', 'temporary', 'workforce', 'disruptions', 
'supply', 'chain', 'result', 'pandemic', 'implemented', 
'employee', 'safety', 'measures', 'exceed', 'guidance', 
'centers', 'disease', 'control', 'prevention', 'world'] 
"…minor temporary workforce disruptions in our supply 
chain as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. We have 
implemented employee safety measures, based on 
guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention and World…" 
Environment and green growth (topic_4) Autodesk 
['making', 'software', 'choice', 'poised', 'become', 
'next', 'generation', 'professional', 'users', 'climate', 
'change', 'addressing', 'global', 'challenges', 'posed', 
'climate', 'change', 'make', 'possible'] 
"…making software of choice for those poised to become 
the next generation of professional users. Climate Change 
In addressing the global challenges posed by climate 
change, we make it possible…" 
Philanthropy (topic_5) 3M 
['strategy', 'brands', 'becoming', 'planet', 'positive', 
'strengthening', 'roots', 'communities', 'advancing', 
"…strategy and brands by becoming planet positive, 




'social', 'justice', 'includes', 'supporting', 'practices', 
'technologies', 'improve', 'farmer', 'livelihoods', 
'agricultural', 'resiliency'] 
social justice. This includes supporting practices and 
technologies that improve farmer livelihoods and 
agricultural resiliency…" 
Processes, products and services (topic_6) Kellogg Company 
['across', 'value', 'chain', 'meeting', 'targets', 
'responsibly', 'ingredients', 'reducing', 'organic', 
'waste', 'providing', 'packaging', 'living', 'founder', 
'values', 'engaging', 'billion', 'people', 'issue', 
'global'] 
"…across our value c 
hain by meeting our science-based targets, responsibly 
sourcing our ingredients, reducing organic waste and 
providing sustainable packaging. â€¢Living our 
founderâ€™s values by engaging 1.5 billion people in the 
issue of global…" 
Stakeholder management (topic_7) BestBuy 
['procure', 'seek', 'mitigate', 'risk', 'enhance', 
'partnership', 'suppliers', 'create', 'value', 
'stakeholders', 'responsible', 'supply', 'chain', 
'program', 'active', 'members', 'responsible', 
'business', 'alliance', 'allows'] 
"…procure, we seek to mitigate risk, enhance the 
partnership with our suppliers and create value for all 
stakeholders through our Responsible Supply Chain 
Program. We are active members of the Responsible 
Business Alliance, which allows..." 
Values and general interests (topic_8) Packaging Corp of America 
['areas', 'along', 'efforts', 'continue', 'develop', 
'promote', 'maintain', 'diverse', 'workforce', 'culture', 
'environment', 'respect', 'inclusion', 'principles', 
'designed', 'develop', 'promote', 'strong', 'increasing', 
'engagement'] 
"…areas along with efforts to continue to develop, 
promote and maintain a diverse workforce with a culture 
and an environment of respect and inclusion. These 






A3 Terms for additional cleaning of topics 
Table A3.1: Terms to perform additional cleaning on topics 
 




for each topic 
account, acquire, acquisition, agreements, america, approved, april, asset, asterisks, balance 
sheet, bank, business, california, capital, cash, collateral, compliance, cost, credit, debt, 
december, deposit, discount, dividend, drug, earning, end, equity, expense, february, federal, 
filed, financial, first, fiscal, fluctuation, government, impairment, inflation, invest, january, 
july, june, laws, lease, legal, liability, litigation, loan, march, market, may, million, mr, 
obligation, october, operating results, policy, portfolio, president, price, pricing, pursuant, 
rates, receivable, regulation, regulator, return, revenue, securities, september, settlement, 
stock, tax, transaction, valuation, volatility, words, years, york 
Combinations 
with ‘value’ in 




fair value (237312), carrying value (32642), fair values (21629), market value (16094), 
estimated fair value (15740), par value (14198), present value (13606), value reporting 
(12390), value measurements (11116), fair value measurements (11105), fair value 
reporting (10751), value assets (10674), value per (10164), stock par value (10027), value 
hierarchy (9476), fair value hierarchy (9440), value reporting unit (9213), changes fair value 
(8988), value per share (8765), date fair value (8456), measured fair value (7534), value 
measurement (7534),fair value measurement (7449), value company (7044), value shares 
(6270), book value (6116), fair market value (6015), change fair value (5793), value 
common (5524), par value per (5461), intrinsic value (5363), fair value assets (5254), level 
fair value (5210), value stock (5112)… 
Combinations 
with ‘risk’ 





risk factors (22977), credit risk (17978), risks related (14608), risk management (13385), 
risks uncertainties (11990), market risk (11426), item risk (10920), item risk factors 
(10790), rate risk (10243), interest rate risk (9131), risks associated (8889), disclosures 
market risk (5361), subject risk (4887), subject risks (3898), risk controls (3310), periods 
subject risk (3289), risks material (3265), subject risk controls (3249), risk controls may 
(3246), risk associated (3195), risk factors item (2952), risk loss (2937), assess risks (2825), 
risks relating (2811), risks procedures (2712), assess risks material (2708), respond risks 
procedures (2708), procedures respond risks (2707), procedures assess risks (2705), risk 
characteristics (2538), risk material (2526), risk item (2354), market risk item (2264), 
assessing risk (2202), business item risk (2187), risk item financial (2170), assessed risk 
(2164), based assessed risk (2140), assessing risk material (2139), reporting assessing risk 




A4 Modified models in relation to level of board independence and board committees 
Table A4.1: Regression models with factor variable for independence level 
 topic_1	 topic_2	 topic_3	 topic_4	 topic_5	 topic_6	 topic_7	 topic_8	 topics_all	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
…	
strictindepbm1independent	
prevalent	 0.017	 0.016	 0.024	 -0.029	 0.037	 -0.024	 0.009	 0.014	 0.011	
	 (0.033)	 (0.062)	 (0.040)	 (0.038)	 (0.048)	 (0.045)	 (0.027)	 (0.058)	 (0.040)	
strictindepbm1inside	dominant	 -0.026	 0.008	 0.028	 -0.024	 0.033	 -0.011	 -0.002	 0.030	 0.003	
	 (0.037)	 (0.069)	 (0.044)	 (0.043)	 (0.053)	 (0.050)	 (0.030)	 (0.065)	 (0.045)	
strictindepbm1inside	prevalent	 0.025	 -0.006	 0.018	 -0.020	 0.022	 -0.042	 -0.007	 -0.002	 -0.002	
	 (0.032)	 (0.060)	 (0.039)	 (0.038)	 (0.047)	 (0.044)	 (0.026)	 (0.057)	 (0.039)	
genderdiv	 0.043	 0.371*	 0.362***	 0.179	 0.425**	 0.313**	 0.201**	 0.405**	 0.336**	
	 (0.116)	 (0.217)	 (0.138)	 (0.135)	 (0.167)	 (0.158)	 (0.094)	 (0.204)	 (0.140)	
grireport	 0.013	 0.089	 0.100**	 0.007	 0.090*	 0.048	 0.030	 0.115*	 0.080*	
	 (0.038)	 (0.071)	 (0.045)	 (0.045)	 (0.055)	 (0.052)	 (0.031)	 (0.067)	 (0.046)	
Constant	 -1.691***	 -1.729***	 -1.670***	 -1.948***	 -1.704***	 -2.034***	 -1.523***	 -1.469***	 -1.773***	
	 (0.196)	 (0.364)	 (0.234)	 (0.228)	 (0.281)	 (0.266)	 (0.159)	 (0.343)	 (0.236)	
Observations	 2,398	 2,398	 2,398	 2,398	 2,398	 2,398	 2,398	 2,398	 2,398	
R2	 0.009	 0.010	 0.011	 0.007	 0.013	 0.011	 0.008	 0.012	 0.010	
Log	Likelihood	 2,982.312	 2,562.313	 2,466.135	 2,960.480	 2,028.993	 2,746.589	 3,048.083	 1,617.165	 2,574.170	
Note:	 *p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01	
 
Table A4.2: Regression models with binary variables for board committees 
 topic_1 topic_2 topic_3 topic_4 topic_5 topic_6 topic_7 topic_8 topics_all 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
…          
cgboardcom 0.033 0.008 0.043 0.051 0.024 0.074 0.030 0.007 0.028 
 (0.046) (0.085) (0.055) (0.054) (0.066) (0.063) (0.037) (0.080) (0.055) 
genderdiv 0.059 0.372* 0.364*** 0.178 0.428** 0.289* 0.200** 0.405** 0.338** 
 (0.116) (0.217) (0.138) (0.135) (0.167) (0.158) (0.094) (0.204) (0.140) 
grireport 0.031 0.100 0.109** 0.019 0.092 0.056 0.036 0.126* 0.089* 
 (0.040) (0.074) (0.047) (0.047) (0.057) (0.054) (0.032) (0.070) (0.048) 
csrsustboardcom -0.036 -0.029 -0.016 -0.025 -0.0002 -0.016 -0.015 -0.031 -0.022 
 (0.034) (0.063) (0.040) (0.040) (0.049) (0.046) (0.028) (0.060) (0.041) 
Constant -1.755*** -1.758*** -1.670*** -2.025*** -1.676*** -2.134*** -1.562*** -1.471*** -1.808*** 
 (0.199) (0.370) (0.237) (0.231) (0.286) (0.271) (0.161) (0.348) (0.240) 
Observations 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 
R2 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.007 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.010 
Log Likelihood 2,981.852 2,562.340 2,466.641 2,960.847 2,028.933 2,746.856 3,048.360 1,617.276 2,574.397 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
